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This article was written by the Associate Directorate General International Affairs.
The expectations prevailing in early 2014 about a pick-up in the global economy were 
thwarted, to some extent, as the year unfolded. As analysed in detail in the second section 
of this report, the sluggishness of activity was across several regions (the euro area, Japan 
and Latin America), and even China slowed marginally, although it continued to grow at a 
rate of over 7%. By contrast, other areas performed more favourably (the United States, 
the United Kingdom and emerging Europe). This differentiated behaviour of activity came 
about against a background of accommodative monetary policies and less stringent fiscal 
policies. The decline in commodities prices (and of oil in particular) had a downward 
impact on what were already very low rates of inflation, which tended to settle at a lower-
than-expected level in many advanced economies. 
The world economy in 2014 was marked by a series of events that will have far-reaching 
repercussions into 2015. These events included most notably the aforementioned fall in oil 
prices, which steepened sharply in the second half of the year and which has only come 
to a halt in early 2015. While the impact of this shock is, overall, positive for global growth 
(and, in particular, for oil-importing countries), adverse effects on oil-exporting countries 
are proving most notable. Further, as indicated, the decline in oil prices has a downward 
bearing (temporarily, in principle) on inflation rates that are already very low in the advanced 
economies, lessening central banks’ room for manoeuvre in the face of potential adverse 
shocks. Compounding this is the intensification of the cyclical differences between the 
main advanced economies, which has strengthened expectations of divergences in their 
respective monetary policy stances, with potential repercussions for international capital 
markets and financing flows. Other, longer-term trends are also influencing capital markets, 
the outcome of banking disintermediation and of regulatory changes, which affect 
economies’ financing patterns and, therefore, their growth possibilities. And, ultimately, 
this is a further factor shaping the outlook for the emerging economies. In some cases, 
such as Latin America, the disappearance of the favourable external conditions which 
enabled them to grow in the past poses a significant challenge to the sustainability of their 
growth, while in other cases, such as China, a re-gearing of the growth strategy towards a 
more balanced pattern can be seen. These issues, to which geopolitical risks may be 
added, are addressed in the third section of this article. 
Broadly, the forecasts for 2015, included in the fourth section, suggest global growth will 
stabilise at moderate rates (of around 3%-4%). This will be the outcome of greater 
dynamism in the advanced economies and of a further slowdown in the emerging ones. 
Risks appear to be balanced overall, given that the favourable effects of the fall in oil prices 
and of more expansionary economic policies will be counterbalanced by the vulnerabilities 
associated with low inflation, the potentially adverse impact on markets of monetary policy 
divergences in the advanced economies, the possible over-pricing of certain financial 
assets and geopolitical risks. 
In 2014, the world economy grew by 3.3%, a rate similar to that for 2013 (see Table 1) but 
once again below that expected at the start of the year (3.7%). This was due to the 
weakness shown by many emerging economies and by certain advanced countries (see 
top left-hand panel of Chart 1), despite the support provided by economic policies. Global 
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SOURCES: IMF, Banco de España, Eurostat and national statistics.
a GDP and inflation are expressed as a year-on-year percentage change; current account balance, general government balance and gross public debt are expressed 
as a percentage of GDP.
b The quarterly CPI is the average for the quarter.
c Federal government, state and local government liabilities, including pension payment commitments to public sector employees. Obtained from the financial 
accounts published by the Federal Reserve.
d Emerging Asia includes: China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore.
e Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Chile. Excluding Argentina and Venezuela for the CPI aggregate, and Venezuela for the 
aggregate of the general government balance.
f Eastern Europe: Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia.
g Annual data show the latest IMF forecasts publicly available when this report went to press. Quarterly data calculated using a sample of 41 economies (17 advanced 
and 24 emerging) representing almost 90 % of global GDP, weighted in PPP terms. All economies referred to in notes b, c and d are included in the sample.
2013 2014
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
United States
    Gross domestic product 1.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.1 1.9 2.6 2.7 2.4
    Consumer price index (b) 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.2
    Current account balance -3.0 -2.9 -2.4 0.0 -2.6 -2.6 -2.4 -2.0 -2.4 -2.3 -2.3 0.0
    General government balance -9.4 -8.1 -5.2 -4.6 -5.8 -4.7 -5.8 -4.5 -4.7 -4.8 -4.7 -4.4
    Gross public debt (c) 124.6 127.5 125.6 126.1 127.7 126.7 126.1 125.6 126.8 124.9 125.4 126.1
    Unemployment rate 8.5 7.9 6.7 5.6 7.5 7.5 7.2 6.7 6.6 6.1 5.9 5.6
Euro area
    Gross domestic product 1.8 -0.8 -0.4 1.1 -1.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1
    Consumer price index (b) 2.7 2.5 1.4 0.4 1.9 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2
    Current account balance -0.1 1.5 2.2 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.1 3.4 1.4 1.7 2.9 3.4
    General government balance -4.2 -3.6 -2.9 —
    Gross public debt 88.3 92.9 95.2 —
    Unemployment rate 10.7 11.9 11.9 11.3 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.3
United Kingdom
    Gross domestic product 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.6 0.9 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7
    Consumer price index (b) 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.5 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 0.9
    Current account balance -1.7 -3.7 -4.5 — -3.9 -2.3 -6.0 -5.6 -5.1 -5.4 -6.0 —
    General government balance -7.6 -8.3 -5.7 -5.6 -7.6 -6.1 -6.0 -5.7 -5.8 -6.2 -6.1 -5.6
    Gross public debt 75.3 88.6 94.2 91.5 85.4 86.6 86.5 87.3 87.8 88.6 88.0 89.6
    Unemployment rate 8.4 7.8 7.2 5.7 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.7
Japan
    Gross domestic product -0.5 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 -0.3 -1.4 -0.8
    Consumer price index (b) -0.3 0.0 0.4 2.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.9 1.4 1.5 3.6 3.3 2.5
    Current account balance 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2
    General government balance -7.7 -8.6 -7.2 — -7.8 -7.5 -7.3 -7.2 -6.8 -5.9 -5.7 —
    Gross public debt 209.5 216.5 224.2 230.0 218.8 220.8 222.5 224.2 225.7 227.1 228.8 230.0
    Unemployment rate 4.5 4.3 3.7 3.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4
China
    Gross domestic product 9.5 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.8 7.5 7.9 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.3 7.3
    Consumer price index (b) 5.4 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.5
    Current account balance 1.9 2.6 1.9 — 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.6 1.5 1.7 2.0 —
    General government balance -1.8 -1.5 -1.8 — -2.2 -2.2 -2.8 -1.5 -1.8 -2.3 -2.4 —
    Gross public debt 36.5 37.4 39.4 40.7
Emerging Asia (excluding China) (d)
    Gross domestic product 2.3 2.5 5.4 5.4 4.3 5.8 6.0 5.5 4.7 5.5 5.7 5.7
    Consumer price index (b) 2.3 6.4 6.7 5.4 6.8 6.2 6.8 7.2 6.2 6.1 5.3 4.1
    Current account balance 1.9 -1.7 -0.2 — -1.5 -1.6 -1.1 -0.3 0.3 0.9 0.8 —
    General government balance -0.1 -3.1 -3.1 — -2.6 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -2.6 -2.7 -2.6 —
    Gross public debt 51.1 51.6 49.6 49.3
Latin America (e)
    Gross domestic product 4.5 2.8 2.6 — 1.9 3.4 2.7 2.3 1.9 0.3 0.7 —
    Consumer price index (b) 4.9 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.2
    Current account balance -1.0 -1.6 -2.7 — -2.1 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 —
    General government balance -0.6 -0.6 -1.1 — 0.3 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.7 —
    Gross public debt 50.2 51.5 52.5 —
Eastern Europe (f)
    Gross domestic product 3.2 0.6 1.4 2.8 0.1 0.5 2.1 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.5
    Consumer price index (b) 3.9 3.8 1.5 0.3 2.3 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0
    Current account balance -3.6 -3.1 -1.1 — -2.0 -1.3 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 —
    General government balance -3.6 -3.4 -3.2 -0.2
    Gross public debt 50.2 51.5 52.5 —
Memorandum item: GDP growth (a) (g)
    Global 4.1 3.4 3.3 3.3 2.8 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.3 —
    Advanced economies 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.9 0.7 1.1 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 —
    Emerging economies 6.2 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.9 5.5 5.7 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.9 —
Memorandum item: inflation (a) (g)
    Global 5.2 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.1 —
    Advanced economies 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.0
    Emerging economies 7.3 6.1 5.9 5.5 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.7 5.0 5.2 4.9 —
2011 2012 2013 2014
MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS (a) TABLE 1
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trade grew by only 3.1% (against 3.4% in 2013 and the figure of 4.5% expected at the start 
of the year), meaning that the apparent elasticity of trade to global GDP was once again 
below that derived from the historical relationship between both variables (see top right-
hand panel of Chart 1). This reflects both temporary factors – such as the weak behaviour 
of investment, a component with a high import content – and more structural issues (see 
Box 1).
Turning to prices, global inflation held at low levels in the first half of the year, resuming a 
declining path subsequently as it was dragged down by the fall in commodities prices. It 
ended the year below 2% (see bottom right-hand panel of Chart 1). The price of Brent oil, 
which held stable until June at around $110 per barrel, collapsed as from July to $45 per 
barrel as at mid-January 2015, marking a 50% decline in 2014 (see bottom left-hand panel 
of Chart 1). As the following section analyses in greater detail, this heavy fall has been due 
both to demand- and supply-side factors. The prices of other commodities posted a 12% 
decline overall during the year. 
The financial markets continued to be characterised by high liquidity in 2014, although 
there were two clearly differentiated phases during the year. In the first half, expectations 
of an orderly normalisation of monetary policy in the United States and the United Kingdom 
were conducive to an appetite for risk, yield search and low volatility. This environment 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 GLOBAL 
 ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
 EMERGING ECONOMIES 
OVERALL CPI 
% y-o-y 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN 2014. OVERVIEW CHART 1
SOURCES: CPB World Trade Monitor, Consensus Forecast, ICIS Pricing, Datastream-Thomson Reuters, Commodity Research Bureau and national statistics. 
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World trade has traditionally grown more rapidly than GDP; in fact, 
in the 1990s it posted a record gap, exceeding the latter by 2.1 
times. However, in recent years the growth of world trade has 
tended to approach that of GDP, to the point that it has been only 
1.4 times higher on average over the past decade (see Panel 1); in 
2014 it even grew less than GDP.
Three main explanations have been proposed for this fall in the 
trade-GDP growth ratio. First, lesser international fragmentation of 
the value chain (or even relocation processes possibly reversing 
the previous trend towards globalisation), which might give rise to 
less trade-intensive production processes or, tantamount to this, a 
fall in the volume of cross-border transactions per unit of value 
added. Second, changes in agents’ spending patterns, which 
have raised the relative weight of less-traded products, such as 
services and public expenditure, and lowered the importance of 
investment goods or consumer durables. Finally, the third 
explanation commonly posited is a resurgence of protectionism 
(e.g. through an increase in non-tariff barriers, such as quality 
standards or health regulations) or, in a similar vein, slower 
headway in liberalisation and trade integration processes. There 
are, however, alternative explanations, such as changes in relative 
prices and productivities between tradeable and non-tradeable 
goods and the consequences that these changes have on the 
distribution of spending, the statistical effects which hinder proper 
measurement of trade (such as distorted transfer prices or 
accurate quantification of the value added incorporated into 
services trade) or the exhaustion of technological innovations that 
boosted trade (e.g. containerisation).
Using disaggregated annual data for 33 OECD countries, a 
statistical model is estimated for the period 1950-2013 in which 
global imports depend on world GDP and which distinguishes the 
short- and long-term effects.1 This approximation allows global 
elasticity to be decomposed into a weighted average of the 
elasticity of each country and, within that country, of each product. 
In general, the elasticity of manufactured goods trade to GDP is 
observed to have decreased substantially from 2000, while that of 
commodities has increased. In particular, imports of commodities 
in the United States have an elasticity of 4.
BOX 1HAS THE ELASTICITY OF WORLD TRADE TO GDP CHANGED?
SOURCES: IMF, OECD and Banco de España.
a 4-year average.
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The results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of trade 
to GDP at the global level is a fairly persistent phenomenon, 
since the estimated long-term elasticity is 1.3, similar to that 
obtained for the 1970s and much lower than that for the period 
before China jointed the WTO, when elasticity averaged 2.1. 
From the standpoint of traded products, the increase in 
importance of services would be consistent with a lower 
elasticity of world trade to GDP, since trade in these products is 
less sensitive to activity (see Panel 2). The performance of 
government consumption is similar. By contrast, the fall in 
investment accounts for a very small percentage of the observed 
decrease in elasticity (see Panel 3).
BOX 1HAS THE ELASTICITY OF WORLD TRADE TO GDP CHANGED? (cont’d)
was consistent with some correction of the overpricing of certain segments with high 
credit risk, such as high-yield corporate debt. As from August, markets worsened and risk-
aversion increased, owing to a combination of several factors. Adding to doubts over the 
strength of global growth were the heightening of geopolitical risks (notably Ukraine and 
the Middle East) and the sharpness of the collapse in oil prices, denting the optimism 
prevailing in the previous period. This translated into abrupt increases in volatility (especially 
in exchange rates and interest rates) and into greater sensitivity to adverse news, which 
affected stock market performance. In 2015 to date, concern over these factors appears 
to have diminished, in a more favourable environment, spurred by the launch of the 
Eurosystem’s asset purchase programmes and by the stabilising of oil prices. 
In addition to high volatility, another characteristic feature of market behaviour in 2014 was 
the strong appreciation of the dollar against other currencies (see top panel of Chart 2), in 
a setting in which the different cyclical positions of the main advanced economies (United 
States and the United Kingdom, set against the euro area and Japan) continued to support 
a differentiated stance for their monetary policies. However, long-term bond yields in these 
economies tended to fall overall from the summer (even turning negative in some cases), 
in a movement which reflects the search for safe-haven assets and the flight to quality. 
In the case of the financial markets in the emerging economies, the vulnerability shown by 
them since mid-2013 was exacerbated by the successive scaling back of growth prospects, 
which bore down on stock market performance. In addition, the depreciation of the dollar 
lessened the attractiveness of carry trade in the emerging markets, which posted capital 
outflows in some segments and a significant depreciation of their currencies. From October 
onwards, these unfavourable trends became more accentuated (markedly so in Latin 
America and in Eastern Europe) and the risk premia of some of these countries marked 
their highest levels since 2009. The downturn not only affected some countries considered 
vulnerable, but also those which in previous episodes had stood out owing to their strength, 
but for which oil is the main export commodity and source of public revenue. 
Activity in the advanced economies in 2014 was more dynamic than the previous year, 
though below expectations (1.8% against 2.2%). As can be seen in the top panel of 
Chart  3, these developments mask a divergence between the greater strength of the 
recovery in the United States (where growth was 2.4%, despite the bad weather in Q1) and 
the United Kingdom (2.6%), and that in the euro area (0.8%) and Japan (0%). In the first 
two countries, growth was underpinned by domestic demand, strengthened by the 
correction of their imbalances (debt, etc.), favourable monetary and financial conditions, 
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and a substantial labour market improvement, since the unemployment rate fell from 6.7% 
to 5.6% in the United States, and from 7.1% to 5.8% in the United Kingdom (see bottom 
left-hand panel of Chart 3). In the case of Japan, growth as from Q1 was lower than 
expected, since the effects of the rise in tax on consumption, in April, were more severe 
than anticipated and led the economy to move once more into recession, since GDP fell 
SOURCE: Datastream-Thomson Reuters.
a Simple average of the countries.
b Emerging economies is calculated adding EMBI differential + Composite to the US yield.
c Spreads, in basis points, of sovereign bond yields against the dollar.
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forcefully in Q2 and Q3. There was something of a rise in Q4 both in Japan and in the euro 
area, supported by the favourable effects of lower energy prices. In the United States and 
the United Kingdom, growth remained robust, but lower than in the previous quarters. 
Inflation rates in the advanced economies, which were already at low levels (and far below 
central bank targets in the euro area and in Japan), fell sharply from mid-year, dragged 
down by oil prices (see bottom right-hand panel of Chart 3). US inflation ended the year at 
0.8%, and at 0.5% in the United Kingdom, against a background of moderate wage growth 
and exchange rate appreciation. In the euro area, inflation was in negative territory (-0.2%) 
in December 2014, and there have been further declines in the opening months of 2015. In 
Japan the inflation rate ended the year at 2.4%, although stripping out the effect of tax 
rises it held at far below the target of 2% and ended the year at 0.4%. Core inflation rates 
were more stable, but also declined somewhat in the second half of the year, and in the 
case of the euro area they remained far off the 2% reference; inflation expectations derived 
from financial instruments also fell, while those arising from surveys proved more stable. 
Against this backdrop, monetary policies retained a highly accommodative but differentiated 
stance, in keeping with the different cyclical positions of the economies (see top panels of 
Chart 4). New expansionary measures were introduced in Japan and in the euro area, while 
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the US Federal Reserve gradually withdrew its financial asset purchases, winding them up 
in October, and eliminated the quantitative references to the unemployment rate in its 
forward guidance policy, shifting to a more qualitative formulation. The Bank of England 
held its official rate at 0.5% and maintained the volume of its asset purchase programme, 
further adopting restrictive macroprudential measures aimed at reducing the risks arising 
for indebted households from the increase in house prices. Moreover, at end-2014 it 
extended its Funding for Lending Scheme for another year, solely for loans to SMEs. In late 
October the Bank of Japan expanded its asset purchase programme indefinitely, stepping 
up the annual rate of purchases from ¥60-70 billion to ¥80 billion, and it extended its 
financing-supporting measures. Faced with the fall in inflation and the attendant slippage 
in medium-term expectations, the ECB adopted new monetary easing decisions in the 
June-September 2014 period: it cut its official rates and committed itself to holding them 
at low levels over a prolonged period, and it introduced a new longer-term financing facility, 
linked to the granting of loans, and two private debt purchase programmes, which have 
been extended in January 2015 to purchases of government securities. 
Among the central banks of other advanced economies, those in Sweden, Canada, 
Australia and Norway cut their official interest rates in the second half of the year in order 
to tackle the slowdown in their economies and low inflation. The Bank of Sweden placed 
SOURCES: Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Datastream-Thomson Reuters and IMF.
a The forecast for Japan start in 2013.
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its official rate in negative territory in early 2015 and announced a public debt purchase 
programme. The Danish and Swiss central banks had to react to the expansionary 
measures of the ECB in order to contain the pressures on their exchange rates: in 
Denmark’s case, with large-scale foreign exchange interventions and making its deposit 
rates negative; and in Switzerland’s case, by abandoning the Swiss franc’s foreign 
exchange ceiling against the euro, which it had maintained since 2011, given the difficulty 
of defending this ceiling and the large size of its central bank balance sheet. 
Fiscal policies held on a path of consolidation in the advanced economies, albeit at a lesser 
pace than in the preceding years, except in Japan (see bottom left-hand panel of Chart 4). 
The average deficit declined by 0.5 pp to 3.9% of GDP, although public debt ratios continued 
increasing and rose to 106.5% of GDP (see bottom right-hand panel of Chart 4). In particular, 
the US budget deficit stood at 5.5% of GDP, 0.3 pp down on the previous year; the UK 
deficit was 5.3%, 0.4 pp below the previous year’s figure; and in the euro area it is estimated 
at 2.6%, 0.3 pp less than in 2013. In Japan, following the rise in the tax rate on consumption 
in April, adverse developments in the economy led Prime Minister Abe to introduce a new 
fiscal stimulus package and to postpone the second increase in the tax on consumption 
until 2017. Notwithstanding these measures, the deficit dipped from 7.2% of GDP in 2013 
to 5.7% in the period from October 2013 to September 2014. 
In short, the correction of domestic imbalances in the advanced economies continued in 
2014, more clearly so in the United States and the United Kingdom. Along with the 
reduction in high unemployment rates and headway in the process of fiscal consolidation, 
as earlier mentioned, the deleveraging of the private sector and the recovery in the real 
estate market moved ahead. Thus, non-financial private sector debt fell in the United 
States and the United Kingdom by 26 pp and 35 pp of GDP, respectively, to 147% and 
162%, from the peaks reached during the crisis. The correction of the private debt ratios 
has been more modest in the euro area as a whole, although in those cases where the 
imbalances built up were greatest, the adjustment has been sharper. On the real estate 
markets, the recovery has remained relatively slow in the United States and somewhat 
more dynamic in the United Kingdom, although in this latter case supply-side constraints 
have led to higher growth in house prices. 
Turning to the emerging economies, their growth rate fell for the fourth year running from 
4.7% in 2013 to 4.4% (see Table 1 and top left-hand panel of Chart 5), 0.5 pp below the 
projections at the start of the year. The moderation was partly the outcome of the slowdown 
in China (7.4%, against 7.7% in 2013), but Latin America and Russia were the regions that 
showed most weakness. The marked decline in commodities prices and, in the case of 
Russia, trade and financial sanctions, were key to explaining these developments. 
The slowdown in China ran in parallel to the gradual easing in inflation. This downtrend in 
price growth became more accentuated in early 2015, strongly influenced by the fall in oil 
prices, and it was likewise perceptible in core inflation, which stood at a year-on-year rate of 
1.1%. However, these developments do not appear to jeopardise the ongoing re-balancing of 
demand, as there is a significant inflation differential in favour of non-tradable goods and 
services. Against a backdrop of economic slowdown and declining inflation such as that 
described, macroeconomic policy has tended to be supportive of growth, initially in a selective 
fashion, with measures in the fiscal and monetary realms, and subsequently with more general 
measures, such as interest rate cuts aimed at preventing greater rises in the cost of financing. 
In the rest of emerging Asia, growth was slightly lower than in 2013 (except in India), standing 
around 4.6%. Inflation eased appreciably, especially in the second half of the year, as a result 
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of the decline in energy prices, although the depreciation of exchange rates softened the 
impact. That provides some room to implement more expansionary monetary policies, while 
adopting macroprudential measures to limit risks (see top right-hand panel of Chart 5). 
The slackness in activity observed since the second half of 2013 continued in Latin 
America, making for GDP growth of 1.2% in 2014, 2 pp less than expected. Activity ground 
to a halt more markedly in those countries with less economic policy headroom, such as 
Argentina and Venezuela, which are both in recession and with very high inflation rates. 
Brazil also slowed considerably, partly owing to the uncertainty over elections. The 
commodities-exporting economies more exposed to China, such as Chile and Peru, saw 
a small increase in activity. Colombia, in contrast, maintained sound growth, although in 
the second half of the year it was affected by the collapse in oil prices, oil being its main 
commodity export. Mexico decoupled from these trends owing to its trade integration with 
the United States, although its recovery was also weaker than expected. Despite the 
sluggishness of growth, consumer prices surprised analysts by rising in several countries 
(see top right-hand panel of Chart 5). In Argentina and Venezuela, inflation was spurred by 
the monetary financing of the budget deficit and the depreciation of the exchange rate, 
and stood at very high rates. In the five countries with inflation targets – namely Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Chile and Brazil – inflation ran at 4.9% on average, 0.5 pp up on 2013 and 
above-target (in some cases even above the upper limit of the target band), impacted by 
the feed-through of exchange rate depreciations and pressures in the services sectors.
SOURCES: IMF, Datastream-Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg and national statistics.
a For the composition of the country aggregates, see footnotes to Table 1. 
b Forecasts refer to WEO, October 2014.
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Economic policies in Latin America diverged significantly. Both Brazil and Colombia tightened 
their monetary and fiscal policies, Brazil procyclically so, sharpening the adjustment of its 
economy in the short term. Chile and Peru, by contrast, harnessed the room for manoeuvre 
provided by the soundness of their economic fundamentals to relax monetary policy and 
announce fiscal stimulus to counter the slowdown in activity. Mexico eased its monetary 
policy, against a background of low inflation and gradually firmer growth, but it announced a 
fiscal adjustment in early 2015 warranted by expectations of lower oil prices in the future. One 
key aspect is the greater attention being afforded to structural reforms as a means of raising 
potential growth. Mexico has taken the lead on this matter, with a broad raft of reforms in 
recent years, and there has also been progress in Chile in this respect. 
Finally, growth in Eastern Europe became more buoyant, standing slightly below 3% (1.4% 
in 2013), chiefly on the basis of the resilience of domestic demand. In a setting of very low 
inflation, weakness in the euro area and repercussions from the conflict between Ukraine 
and Russia, several central banks in the region further eased their monetary policies. 
Capital flows trended favourably in the first half of the year, but with some cross-regional 
differences: those targeted on emerging Asia increased sharply, and those on the advanced 
economies somewhat less so, while Latin American and Eastern European flows held stable 
(see left-hand panel of Chart 6). In 2014, current account imbalances lessened slightly (see 
right-hand panel of Chart 6), chiefly owing to the moderation of the surplus of the oil-exporting 
countries. The reduction in oil prices should contribute to a greater adjustment of global 
imbalances, although the persistence of low prices may lead to changes in the direction of 
some capital flows, the implications of which have yet to be analysed. Conversely, in terms of 
stocks, the imbalances of the net international investment position have increased. 
As discussed in the previous section, the marked fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014 
is attributable both to demand-side factors (owing to the lower growth of the emerging and 
of some of the developed economies) and supply-side factors. In this respect, in addition 
to rising output in non-conventional oil (in particular shale oil) in the United States in recent 
years, this year has seen the partial recovery in the output of certain OPEC members 
subject to geopolitical tensions (such as Libya and Iraq). But the key factor has been the 
Factors of relevance 
for the world economy 
in 2015 
THE REDUCTION IN OIL PRICES: 
CONSEQUENCES AND OUTLOOK 
SOURCES: IMF, World Bank, national statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream-Thomsom Reuters and EPFR Global.
a For the composition of the country aggregates, see footnotes to Table 1. 
b Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.
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change in attitude in Saudi Arabia, which has shifted from regulating its output to stabilise 
crude oil prices to defending its market share. 
Like any favourable supply-side shock, the reduction in oil prices entails an increase in 
real income and a fall in prices at the global level. However, it also involves a strong 
redistribution of income between net oil exporting and importing countries. The 
countries benefiting most are the main net importers, owing to the improvement in the 
terms of trade (see left-hand panel of Chart 7 in the case of the G 20 countries). In this 
group, the case of the United States may be highlighted; despite being the biggest 
global producer, it is also the biggest consumer and a net importer. Accordingly, the 
impact of the fall in prices is also expected to benefit the US economy. Conversely, 
those most harmed are the net exporting countries, which face strong contractions in 
the value of their output (see right-hand panel of Chart 7). Indeed, for most of these 
countries the redistributive effects predominate in the total effect, whereby their 
expected growth has been revised significantly downwards and they have faced greater 
turbulence on the financial markets. Moreover, the very intensity of the decline in prices 
may have had an additional unfavourable effect, by increasing uncertainty at the global 
level. 
There are other effects of the reduction in oil prices that should be highlighted. First, 
heightened downward pressures on prices in countries with already-very-low inflation 
rates and interest rates close to zero, such as in Europe and Japan. In such an environment, 
there is a risk that the fall in goods and services prices – the outcome of the direct impact 
of lower fuel prices – will feed through to a persistent reduction in inflation expectations, 
affecting wages and potentially deriving in a downward price spiral that is difficult to curb 
owing to the scant leeway available to monetary policy. This poses a challenge for central 
bank communication policy, since part of the beneficial effects for importing countries, 
associated with the improvement in their net exports, might be partially mitigated by the 
unfavourable effects of any future deflation on demand. Further, in addition to the fall in 
non-energy imports by the oil-exporting countries (and the subsequent ensuing adverse 
impact on world trade), it should be borne in mind that many of these countries have 
accumulated a portion of their fiscal revenues of the past decade in sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), which are typically invested in real or financial assets in the developed 
economies. The fall in prices may force these funds to reduce their investment (and even 
to disinvest), which would prompt downward pressures on asset prices and upward 
pressures on interest rates.
SOURCE: JODI-Oil World Database.
a Aggregate constructed from data for Germany, France and Italy.
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After touching bottom in late January 2015, with a barrel of Brent below $50, prices have 
since rebounded towards $60. It is difficult to gauge their course in the medium term, 
which will depend on the behaviour of supply and demand. On the supply side, there are 
three notable factors that may alter the current situation. Firstly, the decline in prices might 
prompt a contraction in the US shale oil industry, which is made up of many medium-sized 
producers which, in some cases, are highly indebted. This contraction would reduce 
expected crude oil output, or it would at least lessen its growth rate; indeed, a recent rise 
in well closures in the United States appears to be discernible. Secondly, the fall in revenue 
– and the associated social tensions – might give rise to instability in some of the main 
producers, which would also lead to lower output. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia might resume its 
traditional strategy of regulating supply in an attempt to stabilise prices at a level higher 
than at present, which seems unlikely in light of the declarations by its authorities. Probably, 
current price levels would deter investment in new extraction capacity and in the exploration 
of reserves, thus reducing the growth rate of supply in the medium term. Generally, 
investment might become more volatile, as could prices. On the demand side, current 
prices should stimulate growth, raising the demand for crude oil in the medium term. It will 
be the interaction of all these factors that determines the path of prices over the coming 
year. 
As earlier mentioned, the fall in oil prices is one of the factors behind the generalised 
reduction in inflation rates, especially in the second half of 2014. Nonetheless, the low 
inflation figures in the advanced economies date back some time. Since mid-2011, inflation 
has been on a declining trend, owing chiefly to the lesser contribution of the energy 
component and of food prices. Core inflation (which excludes fresh food and energy) has 
held more stable, although in some cases – as in the euro area and Japan – it has also 
fallen significantly, departing from official inflation targets. In 2015, if the path of slightly 
rising oil prices shown by the futures markets holds, the contribution of the energy 
component to the OECD countries’ inflation rates will be negative, especially in the first 
half of the year, correcting itself subsequently up to November, since November 2014 was 
the time of the biggest slump (see left-hand panel of Chart 8). 
This setting of very low inflation rates in the advanced economies, against a background 
of economic recovery and strong monetary stimuli, prompts a two-sided debate. On one 
hand, as to whether the determinants of inflation have changed, since during the crisis the 
opposite occurred: inflation rates held above what such a contractionary episode would 
suggest. On the other, as to whether the maintenance of very low inflation rates may have 
adverse economic effects, especially if they are prolonged over time and feed through to 
long-term inflation expectations. 
Regarding the determinants of inflation, the standard Phillips curve models consider the 
degree of slack in the economy – measured via the business cycle or cyclical unemployment 
– and agents’ inflation expectations, along with other elements (commodities prices, the 
exchange rate, etc.). Various studies have shown how, in recent decades, the sensitivity of 
inflation to the degree of slack in the economy has diminished (see right-hand panel of 
Chart 8).1 That could be due to factors such as the credibility gained by central banks in 
attaining inflation targets – which would result in a greater anchoring of long-term inflation 
DETERMINANTS 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF LOW 
INFLATION IN THE ADVANCED 
ECONOMIES 
1  See IMF (2013), “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Has Inflation Been Muzzled or Was It Just Sleeping?”, Chapter 3 of 
the World Economic Outlook, April 2013, or BIS (2014), “Growth and inflation: drivers and prospects”, Chapter 4 
of the BIS Annual Report 2014. The lesser sensitivity of inflation to the degree of slack in the economy is not, 
however, general. See, for example, Álvarez and Urtasun (2013), “Variation in the cyclical sensitivity of Spanish 
inflation: an initial approach”, Economic Bulletin, July-August, Banco de España.
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expectations around monetary policy objectives and in a higher coefficient of inflation 
expectations in the Phillips curve – or to the effects of globalisation, since there is evidence 
of global factors accounting for more in determining inflation than the cyclical position of 
each economy. These factors would explain why inflation did not fall to lower levels during 
the crisis, when output gaps were very negative, and why at present inflation rates are 
holding at low levels despite the reduction in the degree of economic slack. In addition, 
factors linked to each country’s specific circumstances might be contributing to holding 
inflation rates down, such as the appreciation of exchange rates and wage moderation in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. In the United States, pent-up wage deflation 
would account for inflation moderation, whereas the sluggishness of productivity would be 
the operative factor in the United Kingdom. 
As regards the effects of continuing very low inflation rates over a prolonged period, it 
should first be said that they contribute to raising real interest rates, acting as a drag on 
agents’ spending decisions and generating more unemployment.2 Further, against a 
background of high debt of the national sectors, a very low inflation rate hampers the 
deleveraging process and increases the debt burden. Also, within a monetary union such 
as the euro area, very low inflation rates across the region make the adjustment of relative 
prices that economies with competitiveness problems have to make more costly in terms 
of unemployment. Finally, the most harmful effects would arise if inflation expectations 
became unanchored, posing deflationary risks. In this respect, it is important to be watchful 
concerning the observed decline in inflation expectations in the main advanced economies, 
a decline which, to date, has been more marked in the short-term segment, but which is 
also discernible in certain measures of long-term inflation expectations. This is one of the 
challenges that must be tackled by monetary policy in the advanced economies, in a 
setting characterised by growing cyclical divergences, as discussed in the following 
section. 
SOURCES: Datastream-Thomson Reuters, OECD, IMF and Banco de España.
a Forecasts of energy component contribution to the CPI taking oil price futures as a reference. 
b Each point represents the quarterly average of core inflation and cyclical unemployent in advanced economies.
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2  The harmful effects of an inflation rate below central bank targets over a prolonged period, even keeping inflation 
expectations well anchored, have been highlighted in the literature. See, for example, Svensson (2015), “The 
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After finalising its asset purchases in 2014, the Federal Reserve has signalled that the 
process of normalisation of US monetary policy will begin in 2015. This intention reflects 
the soundness of the recovery in the labour market (in respect of job creation and of the 
reduction in the unemployment rate, which is drawing closer to its equilibrium level) and 
confidence that the current decline in inflation will be a temporary phenomenon and 
that it will return eventually to its 2% target. As part of this process of normalisation, the 
first step will be the raising of the official interest rate (the federal funds target rate) from 
the low at which it has stood (0 %-0.25 %) since December 2008, while the volume of 
assets on the Fed balance sheet will hold constant, with proceeds from maturing assets 
being reinvested. The normalisation of the central bank’s balance sheet, in terms of the 
reduction of its size and the move to a shorter-dated asset structure, will take place in 
a second stage. It is sought by these announcements on future monetary policy 
decisions to minimise the distortions this process may entail for the normal functioning 
of financial markets, avoiding experiences such as that in May 2013 when the mere 
announcement that the Fed was considering reducing the volume of asset purchases 
under its quantitative easing programme (QE3) led to a sharp reaction by the financial 
markets. 
Compared with the situation in the United States, and with the exception of the Bank of 
England, a large number of the advanced economies’ central banks have opted in recent 
months to add greater measures of monetary expansion, set against the downward 
revisions of their growth forecasts and, mainly, downside pressures on prices and inflation 
expectations (see left-hand panel of Chart 9). Hence the period of convergent (and non-
standard) monetary policies in the developed economies, which prevailed from end-2008, 
appears to have concluded. Since the outlook for 2015-2016 assumes an increase in the 
cyclical divergences between these countries, the differences in their monetary policy 
stances might become greater. 
These differences in monetary policy decisions have been manifest in exchange rate 
developments, with the dollar appreciating by more than 15% in nominal effective terms 
since mid-2014 (see top left-hand panel of Chart 2), but not in the same manner in the 
yield spreads on longer-dated debt (see top right-hand panel of Chart 2), since yields 
have also fallen in the United States, dragged down by the international environment 
(see Box 2). 
MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS 
IN THE ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
IN A SETTING OF CYCLICAL 
DIVERGENCES 
MONETARY POLICY AND CYCLICAL DIVERGENCES CHART 9
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
Mar-2015 Dec-2015 Dec-2016 
 FED (18.3.2015)  FED (17.12.2014) 
 FUTURES (19.03.2015)  FUTURES (18.12.2014) 
  
RATE EXPECTATIONS FUTURES VS MEDIAN FOMC 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 JAPAN  UNITED STATES 
 UNITED KINGDOM  EURO AREA 
  
  
    
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS (5y-5y) 
  
SOURCES: Datastream-Thomson Reuters and Federal Reserve. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2015 SITUATION OF AND OUTLOOK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AT THE START OF 2015 
In 2014, debt yields in the main developed economies held on a 
declining trend, which was more pronounced from the summer 
(see Panel 1). This was in contrast to the divergent stance of 
monetary policies in the main developed economies. While these 
differences have already translated into a strengthening of the 
dollar against the leading currencies, government debt yields, 
which should accompany the expectation of official interest rate 
rises, have only very recently reacted. This Box analyses the 
possible determinants of the low level of yields in the United 
States. 
Although the reduction in US 10-year yields has coincided with 
lower long-term inflation expectations (see Panel 2), their decline 
appears to be related to a greater extent to the reduction in the 
term premium. This variable, which in theory is associated with the 
uncertainty of predicting the possible path of short-term interest 
rates, showed abnormally low values during the periods in which 
the Federal Reserve was actively purchasing fixed-income 
securities. In May 2013, with the start of discussions about 
tapering, the term premium increased and held at levels closer to 
its historical average. However, during 2014 this variable showed 
a further decline, even turning negative (see Panel 3). 
Several factors may lie behind these developments in the term 
premium. First, there may be a precautionary motive, with flight-to-
quality movements prompted by a more volatile environment. Such 
a consideration may have been more significant from August last 
year, when a combination of several factors prompted an increase 
in uncertainty on markets. Among these factors are the bleaker 
outlook for global growth, fears of deflation in the developed 
economies, growing geopolitical risk and the collapse in crude oil 
prices. This setting triggered flight-to-quality movements, as 
suggested by the increase in yields on high-risk assets, and it 
might also have exerted an influence in the opposite direction on 
long-term US debt yields, given their safe-haven status.
Second, the convergence of long-term rates in the developed 
economies might also reflect a shortage of assets considered as 
BOX 2DETERMINANTS OF US LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
SOURCES: Datastream, Federal Reserve and Barclays Capital.
a Forward Inflation swaps. 5-year interest rate in 5 years time. 
b Forward swap.
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 UNITED STATES  GERMANY 
 UNITED KINGDOM  JAPAN 
% 
1  10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS 
INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 10-YEAR BOND  TERM PREMIUM 
% 
3  UNITED STATES: 10-YEAR BOND YIELD AND TERM PREMIUM 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Jan-15 
 UNITED STATES  EURO AREA 
 UNITED KINGDOM  JAPAN (b) 
% 
2  INFLATION EXPECTATIONS (a) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
12/03/2015 01/08/2014 01/01/2014 
%  
4  US TREASURY BOND YIELD CURVE 
years 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2015 SITUATION OF AND OUTLOOK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AT THE START OF 2015 
safe, in a setting in which, on one hand, no increase in annual 
public debt issuance by these countries is foreseen and, on the 
other, where the more expansionary nature of the accommodative 
policies of the ECB and the Bank of Japan reduces the amount of 
such assets available for investors. This setting might explain why 
certain European and Japanese institutional investors, that need 
to invest a significant portion of their portfolio in long-term 
securities, should prefer to assume or cover the foreign exchange 
risk associated with purchasing US debt before acquiring 
securities in their own currencies with negative yields. 
Both factors might persist in the medium term. For one thing, as 
monetary conditions normalise, the period of abnormally low 
volatility of the past year will foreseeably conclude, which might 
trigger flight-to-quality movements in the event of sharp rises. For 
another, the supply of safe assets would not seem likely to expand in 
a context of public finances consolidation in the main developed 
countries. Accordingly, a scenario cannot be ruled out in which the 
10-year yield does not react once the rise in official rates has started, 
which would pose a major challenge to the Federal Reserve in terms 
of the degree of tightening it may consider necessary, given the 
situation of the economy. In this respect, recent yield curve 
developments, where the shorter-dated segments have reacted to 
expectations of rises while the curve has declined in the longer-
dated segments, suggest the possibility that the conundrum of the 
previous contractionary cycle may be revived (see Panel 4). But nor 
is it possible to rule out a scenario of greater volatility on financial 
markets as a result of wider differences between monetary policies, 
especially between the United States and the euro area and Japan, 
with significant increases in long-term interest rates globally.
BOX 2DETERMINANTS OF US LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES (cont’d)
As regards the process of normalisation to be pursued by the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), the markets are currently discounting a 100-125 bp increase in the 
federal funds target rate to end-2016, which marks a slightly gentler and more gradual 
rising path than that envisaged by the FOMC members themselves (see right-hand panel 
of Chart 9). The difference may reflect a differing assessment of the reaction function of the 
FOMC, or of the degree of recovery in the US economy and/or of the inflation outlook, 
which may be summarised overall in the slack existing in the labour market. Hence, 
although the unemployment rate is already close to the NAIRU (the estimate for which was 
revised downwards in March 2015), other indicators – such as wage trends – are still far 
removed from what would be a normalised labour market situation. Moreover, both the 
expansionary effect of the decline in long-term bond yields on the US economy and the 
restrictive effect of the dollar’s appreciation (through the trade channel and incomes, owing 
to their impact on corporate profits) may hamper the process of monetary policy 
normalisation. In sum, this process poses a notable challenge as it must unfold in a setting 
of cyclical and monetary policy divergence, with low inflation, and it may give rise to 
episodes of volatility on financial markets.
Major headway was made in 2014 in the regulatory reform of the banking sector. The 
FSB’s proposal for a new requirement to equip global systemic banks with sufficient total 
loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) to ensure their orderly resolution, avoiding the use of 
public funds and guaranteeing the continuity of their critical functions, marked the 
completion of the new regulatory framework for banks following the financial crisis. Thus, 
while there are still aspects and details to be ironed out in the coming years, last year saw 
a significant reduction in the regulatory uncertainty facing credit institutions when deciding 
on their future business strategies. 
The new regulatory arrangements frame a setting conducive to a lesser role for bank 
intermediation and to a more important one for the capital markets in the financing of 
certain sectors, such as large corporations and infrastructure projects (see left-hand panel 
of Chart 10). Indeed, disintermediation has progressively stepped up in recent years, as 
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the banking sector has adapted to new requirements, in keeping with the transition phases 
laid down by regulators. This trend coincides, moreover, with a change in the type of 
participants on capital markets, where the role of institutional investors has taken on 
greater importance at the expense of banks (see right-hand panel of Chart 10). 
Overall, a framework has been set in place in which the financial position of the banking 
sector comes out stronger, as both the risks banks incur and the consequences following 
a potential bankruptcy and the likelihood of using taxpayers’ funds in the ensuing bailout 
have diminished. At the same time, other agents – such as pension and investment funds, 
and insurers – assume a greater role in the process of financial intermediation, in segments 
in which they were previously not present. This more diversified and resilient environment 
than was the case before the crisis is not, however, free from risks. In this respect, 
regulators and supervisors are beginning to pay greater attention to issues such as the 
behaviour of institutional investors when faced with bouts of tension, the effects investment 
by these agents in less liquid assets may have or the difficulties certain firms may encounter 
in re-financing their issues, especially against the background of an appreciating dollar. At 
the same time, there is also monitoring of the developing and growing activity of agents 
which, lying outside the banking regulation perimeter, perform intermediation services very 
similar to those of credit institutions. 
Ahead in 2015, a scenario is taking shape in which banking intermediation will continue to 
be moderate – given the steps banks still have to take in order to meet the new requirements 
– and in which financing via the markets may be influenced by the likely tightening of 
monetary policy in the United States. This scenario should affect to a greater extent those 
agents with greater dependence on dollar market funds, as is the case of the emerging 
countries (and in particular of Latin America), although the consequences for each 
economy will depend on the responsiveness of national banks or on the possibility of 
companies funding themselves in other currencies. 
The easing of growth in the emerging economies is proving to be one of the most significant 
facets of global economic developments. These economies have been operating against 
a backdrop of lacklustre and uneven recovery in the developed economies, which has 
been compounded – sequentially and to differing degrees of significance – by three types 
of shocks. The first has been the slowdown in the Chinese economy, in train since 2011, 
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with major consequences for the commodities prices and external demand of its main 
trading partners in Asia and Latin America. In the past four years, Chinese growth has 
declined by 4 pp from close to 11% in 2010 to little over 7% in 2014, partly as a result of 
the decision by its authorities, endorsed following the change in government in 2012, to 
attain a more balanced and sustainable growth pattern. The other two shocks are more 
recent: on one hand, the tightening of external financing conditions, which has come 
about, in recurrent episodes, since debate ensued in mid-2013 on the start of tapering in 
the United States, and which might intensify when the Federal Reserve initiates the process 
of normalisation of interest rates in 2015; and on the other, the decline in oil prices in the 
second half of 2014. 
During 2014, the signs of a re-balancing of the Chinese economy became more patent 
(see left-hand panel of Chart 11). From the expenditure standpoint, the weight of private 
consumption increased by 3 pp of GDP compared with 2013, to stand at 52%, in parallel 
with a decline in the investment ratio. As to the sectors of activity, services continued to 
increase their share in GDP, rising to 48% at the expense of industry (36%) and the primary 
sector (6%). The measures adopted by the authorities cover various realms, ranging from 
the financial and the environmental to the fiscal. Since 2013, and especially the first half of 
2014, limits have been placed on the growth of non-bank credit in the highest-risk 
segments of the financial system. The spending capacity of local governments has also 
been curbed and financing conditions have been tightened for second-home purchases. 
This has all made for a marked moderation in investment, adding to the ongoing adjustment 
of the sectors with idle capacity, chiefly in manufacturing and heavy industry. At the same 
time, the cumulative increase in household per capita income, arising from improved 
wages in the public and private sectors alike, has underpinned higher growth in private 
consumption, which was also boosted over the past year by an improvement in income 
distribution. Also in 2014, external and domestic financial liberalisation stepped up, with 
significant progress in making the exchange rate and interest rates more flexible, and the 
announcement of the forthcoming establishment of a deposit guarantee scheme, all of 
which will promote the mobilisation of saving. In these circumstances, activity in China 
continued to slow in 2014. 
From a broader standpoint, the recent slowdown in China is largely the result of the 
implementation of a series of economic policy measures geared to moderating excesses 
in the financial system, the real estate sector and public spending. In parallel, the re-
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balancing of the economy towards a more sustainable model of development continued, 
with a greater contribution by consumption and a lesser contribution by investment being 
posted in respect of GDP growth. However, the downtrend in inflation, sharper since the 
second half of 2014, has required greater support from monetary policy. 
The significance of China in world trade means that its lower growth will have substantial 
repercussions, especially in the emerging economies. In the case of Latin America, China 
has two main channels of influence: external demand and commodities prices. China has 
become the leading or second trade partner for most South American countries (10-20% 
of their total exports) in just a decade, which has tended to increase the correlation 
between their business cycles. Some estimates associate a 1 pp fall in the growth of the 
Chinese economy with a 0.6 pp reduction, on average, in Latin American growth. Moreover, 
lower Chinese demand for commodities contributes to reducing the prices of these 
products on international markets, where their cumulative decline since 2011, measured 
by an overall index, stands at over 45%. Just as the continuous increase in the terms of 
trade underpinned economic dynamism in Latin America over the past decade, their 
correction in recent years is symmetrically prompting a decline in income and lower 
growth. In emerging Asia, weaker Chinese growth has led to a slowdown in exports from 
other countries in the region to China, although this easing might more broadly reflect the 
sluggishness of global demand, through its impact on value chains. 
As to the financing conditions of emerging economies on international markets, a pick-up 
in capital inflows towards these economies was observed up until 2014 Q2 (see right-hand 
panel of Chart 6), which probably reversed in the second half of the year, judging by the 
across-the-board depreciation in exchange rates during that period, more markedly so in 
the case of the oil-exporting economies. Thus, on the data available to the first half of 
2014, the recovery in capital inflows could be seen to be particularly intense in emerging 
Asia, including China. Capital inflows were seen to stabilise in Latin America at levels 
somewhat higher than those of 2013, as was the case in Eastern Europe, where they had 
most fallen previously. Even so, both in Latin America and in Eastern Europe, capital 
inflows continue to be lower than those received in 2011. In Latin America, lower capital 
inflows and lower economic activity also translated into a significant slowdown in domestic 
lending to the private sector. And this without the expected increase in US interest rates 
having yet materialised. Both the downward revision of growth forecasts in a good number 
of emerging economies and the rising trend of the dollar appear to presage the continuing 
moderation of capital flows towards these economies, especially if the change in monetary 
cycle in the United States is confirmed. 
So far, the impact of the third shock – the fall in oil prices – is perceptible above all in lower 
inflation rates in Asia. In Latin America, pressures on services prices and the pass-through 
of the depreciation of exchange rates have tended to keep inflation rates relatively high, 
even in the countries with inflation targeting regimes. Foreseeably, the effects on activity 
will be noted to a greater extent in 2015 and will prove clearly positive for most of Asia, but 
differentiated in their impact on Latin American countries. Some Latin American countries 
are particularly vulnerable: the fall in oil prices is especially detrimental to those economies 
whose productive, exporting and revenue-raising specialisation has been geared to oil, 
such as Venezuela, where 96% of exports and 50% of public revenues depend on oil. 
Moreover, Venezuela has a low level of reserves and does not have access to external 
financing markets. For other economies, such as Colombia (where oil accounts for slightly 
over half its exports) or Mexico (where the tax revenue associated with oil exceeds 30% of 
the total and where, moreover, an energy reform has been launched to attract investment 
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and foreign technology to oil production), this is also a major shock. Both countries have 
the scope to withstand this shock, with a high level of international reserves, healthy public 
finances and advanced fiscal rules. In emerging Asia, lower oil prices are exerting a 
favourable impact on most countries’ trade balances (especially in India’s case); the 
exception is Malaysia, the area’s sole net exporter. 
The year 2015 has begun with fresh downward revisions to world growth forecasts. 
However, the net positive effects of the reduction in costs stemming from lower oil prices 
will foreseeably be perceived with greater clarity once the intensity of the adjustment has 
been overcome and even though the permanence of these lower levels may be subject to 
uncertainty. Economic policies will continue to be accommodative, even though cyclical 
differences persist among the main advanced economies along with divergences in 
monetary policy stance, thereby influencing financing conditions at the global level, inter-
regional capital flows and exchange rates. Finally, world trade remains subject to notable 
sluggishness, although a somewhat more favourable tempo can be detected in the 
advanced economies. 
Against this background, the baseline scenario for 2015 includes growth in the world 
economy slightly above that for 2014, at around 3.5% (3.3% in 2014). That would be the 
result of the strengthening of the recovery in the advanced economies – whose average 
growth would be close to 2.5%, around 0.5 pp up on 2014 – and of stabilisation in the 
emerging economies, whereby their average increase would stand marginally below 4.5%.
A widespread strengthening of activity is expected in the advanced economies, albeit at 
differing paces. It will foreseeably be more intense in those economies, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, that have made most headway in adjusting their imbalances 
(private-sector balance sheets, fiscal consolidation, unemployment and the real estate 
sector). In other areas, such as the euro area and Japan, the increase in activity will be more 
moderate. In any event, the recovery will be broadly assisted by the low levels of oil prices 
(with the exception of those economies such as Norway and Canada that are net oil exporters), 
the accommodative stance of monetary policies (even in those economies further along the 
monetary cycle) and the gradual slowdown in the pace of fiscal consolidation. 
In recent years the main emerging economies have recurrently posted lower-than-projected 
growth rates, which have fed through to a significant downward revision in their potential 
growth. In some areas this has been associated with the scant structural reforms made 
during the boom period. However, even bearing in mind this lower long-term growth, in the 
baseline scenario for 2015 the emerging economies are not expected to reach their 
potential, owing to various factors. For these economies as a whole, the increase in 
external demand from the advanced economies and the favourable effect of low oil prices 
on the oil-importing economies will foreseeably be more than offset by the slowdown in 
China (where policy management will perhaps be more focused on mitigating vulnerabilities 
than on stimulating growth), the long-expected normalisation of US monetary policy (and 
the subsequent tightening of global financial conditions and the re-directing of capital 
flows towards the United States) and the adverse impact of the price of oil (and other 
commodities) on exporting economies. This latter factor will particularly affect Russia, 
bearing down on an economy that was already slowing and which, moreover, was subject 
to various sanctions imposed by certain advanced economies. Nor is the outlook 
particularly favourable for the Latin American economies, which are especially sensitive to 
the change in cycle in commodities prices and to the eventual normalisation of global 
financial conditions. 
The outlook for 2015 
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Inflation is generally expected to remain very low (and even post negative levels for much 
of 2015 in many of the advanced economies). This forecast largely resides on the fact that 
a substantial reversal of the decline in commodities prices is not expected and, in the 
case of the advanced economies, on the fact that inflation will continue to evidence 
limited sensitivity to the degree of slack that has been observed in economies in recent 
years. 
Regarding risks of a global scope, recent developments in the oil market (in particular the 
uncertainty over the factors underlying such risks) amplify the risks, in both directions, 
associated with the course of oil prices and with their potential impact; in particular, a 
greater positive impact on global growth cannot be ruled out. Moreover, a substantial 
group of countries (with the significant exceptions of the United States and the United 
Kingdom) are adopting or are ready to adopt more expansionary economic policy 
measures, especially in the monetary policy realm. 
Among the downside risks, divergences in the monetary policy stance in the main 
advanced economies – the result of the marked differences in their cyclical position – pose 
a risk to financial stability. This is because a widening of such differences may prompt 
bouts of turbulence, with sharp adjustments in exchange rates and in other asset prices 
(especially high-yield assets and those of emerging economies) and the sudden relocation 
of capital flows. Further, the persistence of very low inflation rates over a prolonged period 
may check the recovery, insofar as this may raise the real cost of financing and, moreover, 
hamper the debt-reduction process. Also, a sharper slowdown in a systemic emerging 
economy (especially if in China there were to be a disorderly re-balancing of the economy, 
significantly affecting growth) would have an adverse bearing on global growth. Finally, 
geopolitical risks are still very significant, the hotspots being the territorial conflict in 
Ukraine and the spread of terrorism in the Middle East. 
On international financial markets, the prevailing setting of high liquidity has been 
conducive to a build-up of certain significant risks. Thus, although some segments that 
were recently overpriced – such as US high-yield bonds – have been corrected, other 
causes for concern exist, such as the greater credit and liquidity risk arising from the high 
holdings of corporate debt in institutional investors’ portfolios. In parallel, some recent 
structural changes – such as the lesser weight of bank financing and the greater weight of 
financing-providers outside the regulatory perimeter – pose some doubts over the access 
to financing of certain segments such as SMEs, which have traditionally been more 
dependent on bank intermediation. 
Among the specific risks of the advanced economies, the marked decline in inflation in the 
euro area, in other European economies and in Japan (if the impact of the tax rise is 
discounted) increases the possibility of a disanchoring of inflation expectations. Over the 
longer term, in the euro area and Japan the prolonged weakness of demand and the scant 
headway in redressing certain imbalances – mainly the high levels of public and private 
debt – may ultimately entrench a low growth scenario. 
Finally, the emerging economies may be particularly sensitive to bouts of instability on the 
international financial markets, prompted not only by global shocks but also by events in 
specific regions or economies (linked, for example, to problems in oil exporting countries), 
which ultimately translate into a broad change in investor sentiment towards them. Moreover, 
the persistent weakness of growth figures in some cases may suggest that the long-term 
growth capacity of these economies is still overestimated. 
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In sum, the world economy continues to move on a modest growth path which, while 
clearly below its pre-crisis trajectory, may be boosted in the short term by the firming of 
the recovery of the advanced economies, as a result of the continuing low oil price levels 
and the accommodative monetary policy stance. These foreseeably temporary factors 
may prove conducive to more resolute progress in correcting these economies’ imbalances, 
contributing to supporting growth in the emerging economies in a setting which, owing to 
various factors (the expected tightening of global funding conditions, the ongoing 
slowdown in the Chinese economy and the end of the commodities bullish cycle), is 
particularly adverse for some of them. 
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